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Abstract 
 
The crisis of the Eurozone has severely tested the political authority of the European 
Union (EU).  Questions of normative legitimacy are raised by the crisis, both because the 
EU in general is a normative order and because the construction of economic and 
monetary union rested upon an explicit normative theory that stressed the importance of 
the depoliticisation of money.  However, this theory neglected the normative logic of the 
two-level game that is implicit in EMU.  It also neglected problems arising from the 
burdens of judgement implicit in the design of any constitutional order.  By contrast, we 
contend that any reconstruction of the EU’s economic constitution has to pay attention p 
to reconciling a European monetary order with the legitimacy of Member State 
governance.  The EU requires a two-level contract to meet this standard.  The Member 
States must treat each other as equals and be representative of and accountable to their 
citizens on an equitable basis. These criteria entail that the EU’s political legitimacy 
requires a form of demoicracy that we call ‘republican intergovernmentalism’. Only such 
rules as could be acceptable as the product of a political constitution among the peoples 
of Europe can ultimately meet the required standards of political legitimacy. 
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1. The Making of the Legitimacy Crisis 
 
The crisis of the eurozone has severely tested the political authority of the EU. Since 2010 the 
EU has been forced to improvise policies and processes to deal with the crisis, including the 
European Semester, a strengthened Stability and Growth Pact, the Treaty on Stability, 
Coordination and Governance, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) and its 
successors in the European Financial Stability Facility and the European Stability Mechanism 
(Begg 2013).  The European Central Bank (ECB) has embarked upon a policy of long-term 
refinancing operations (LTROs) to improve bank liquidity, in effect buying sovereign debt, as 
well as announcing its willingness to engage in outright monetary transactions (OMT), a policy 
allegedly leading Jens Weidmann, President of the Bundesbank, to say that this is tantamount ‘to 
financing governments by printing banknotes’ (Steen, 2012).  And still the prospect of deflation 
looms over European economies. 
 
The same conditions that gave rise to these policy imperatives have required the EU to find ways 
of supporting the governments of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus in defiance of the 
no bail-out clause of the original monetary union (now Article 125 of the TFEU).  They have 
resulted in the Troika imposing restrictions on the national budgets of indebted governments, 
policies that have been resisted by national parliaments and opposition movements.  They have 
strengthened anti-EU parties, with a record number of Eurosceptic MEPs elected in the European 
elections of May 2014.  They have provoked legal actions in national constitutional courts in 
both creditor countries like Germany (Federal Constitutional Court, 2014a and 2014b) and 
debtor countries like Portugal (Portuguese Constitutional Court, 2014), that question the 
legitimacy of government action under the programmes.  They have stimulated continued, and 
sometimes violent, demonstrations against public expenditure austerity packages.  They have 
entailed the installation of technocratic governments in Greece and Italy in 2012, as a way of 
dealing with the inadequacies of their respective political institutions, as well as the electoral 
defeat of incumbent governments in Spain and France. In short, they have brought about a crisis 
of political legitimacy for the EU. 
 
The Lisbon Treaty was widely regarded as having settled the institutional architecture of the EU 
after nearly two decades of constitutional debate.  The eurozone crisis has reignited those issues.  
The new policies and processes that have been inaugurated have changed the balance of power 
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within the EU and opened up questions about what ‘deep and genuine’ EMU requires by way of 
institutional change (European Commission, 2012).  In these debates issues of normative 
political legitimacy inevitably arise.  The EU is a normative order.  That is to say, the agreements 
underlying it contain principles and values that define norms of behaviour that Member States 
and EU institutions should follow.  The Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP), strengthened through Title VIII of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU), together with the Six Pack and the Two Pack, have required Member 
States to make progressively stronger commitments to one another in respect of economic and 
fiscal policy.  Those commitments have been reinforced by the Fiscal Compact contained in the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 
(TSCG), by which Member States have undertaken to ensure that national budgets are in balance 
or in surplus ‘through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably 
constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the 
national budgetary processes.’ (TSCG, Article 3.2).  These measures and other associated EU 
law and policy provide a set of rules and principles by reference to which policies and 
institutional change are justified.  Resting on agreed norms and principles, they form a political 
contract among Member States. 
 
Questions of normative legitimacy are raised by the crisis not simply as a result of the EU’s 
being a normative order, but also because the construction of economic and monetary union 
(EMU) itself rested upon a set of constitutional principles that contained strong – and contestable 
– normative assumptions.  In particular, economic and monetary union was constructed 
according to the principles of legal constitutionalism (Issing, 2008; James, 2012).  Legal 
constitutionalism is a political doctrine to the effect that a legitimate political regime must rest on 
a set of legal rules that constrain the actions of politically responsive decision makers.  In some 
versions (e.g., Dworkin, 1996) such restrictions take a ‘left liberal’ form; in others (e.g., Hayek, 
1979), they take a neo-liberal form (see Bellamy, 2007).  Our contention in this paper is that the 
developing political contract underlying EMU has produced restrictions on Member States with 
respect to their public budgets that amount to more than simply a treaty agreement; they have 
given rise to a treaty agreement underwritten by the principles of legal constitutionalism of a 
neo-liberal kind, indeed of a specific kind within neo-liberalism. 
 
The tradition of political analysis that fed into the construction of the single currency and its 
management is to be found in the work of thinkers associated with the Hayekian version of 
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constitutional liberalism (see James, 2012: 6-7).  According to this tradition, democratic 
governments have a tendency to fiscal irresponsibility due to politicians having incentives to buy 
votes through excessive public expenditure.  In seeking re-election, political representatives are 
motivated to respond to the wishes of special interest groups in the short term rather than framing 
legislation for the public interest in the long term.  Particular manifestations of these tendencies 
might include the provision of price support schemes for agriculture, the protection of domestic 
industry from foreign competition, interference in controlling the terms of employment contracts 
that can be agreed, and expenditure on public works that benefit only localised constituencies. 
Hayek (1979) held that, to avoid these pitfalls, states need to be constrained by constitutional 
rules and mechanisms from engaging in excessive expenditure and unduly interfering in the 
operations of the free market.  Behind the construction of the specific set of rules for EMU, 
therefore, lay a more general set of premises concerning the character of a democratic political 
order.  
 
The problem with this construction, we argue, is that, when applied to EMU, it neglects the 
normative logic of two-level games.  According to this logic, when governments make 
commitments to one another about their future behaviour, they simultaneously need to be 
responsible and accountable to their domestic populations in order to retain their political 
legitimacy. The logic of two-level games was originally developed by Putnam (1988) to account 
for the outcome of the Bonn economic summit of 1978, and has been subsequently applied to 
empirical cases ranging from security issues to economic diplomacy and North-South relations 
(Evans, Jacobson and Putnam, 1993).  As Pollack (2010: 225) has pointed out, it also lies behind 
liberal inter-governmentalist accounts of EU integration such as that of Moravcsik (1998).  
However, this framework of analysis neither implies fixed preferences (Crespy and Schmidt, 
2014) nor does it have only an empirical use.  Beyond its empirical applications, the logic of 
two-level games also has a normative interpretation (Savage and Weale, 2009) providing a 
model by which we can evaluate the justifiability of constitutional arrangements.   
 
The neglect of the normative logic of two-level games is compounded by a second problem 
within legal constitutionalism, namely its disregard of the existence of reasonable differences in 
political judgement over the principles that should govern a monetary union made up of different 
sovereign states, each with their own traditions of economic and monetary policy.  Indeed, even 
within the broadly neo-liberal tradition of thinking about economic constitutions, there are 
important differences of substance as well as emphasis.  When the conditions for continuing 
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contestation over policy measures and organisation exists, the putative political legitimacy of EU 
legal constitutionalist arrangements, such as those underlying EMU, the SGP and the TSCG, 
reinforce the practical contradiction of the two-level game implicit in the economic constitution.  
By contrast with this attempt to entrench legal constitutionalism, we suggest that the design of an 
economic constitution ought to respect the principles of political constitutionalism, with its 
requirement that governments be responsive to the public reasoning of their citizens within the 
continuing democratic conversation that makes up a political society (Bellamy, 2007). 
 
In pursuing this argument, the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the normative 
logic of a two-level game embodied in the construction of EMU.  According to this logic, those 
participating in international agreements have a dual duty: to deal fairly with one another, on the 
one hand, and to be responsive and accountable to the democratic reasoning of the people whom 
they represent, on the other.  In acknowledging this dual duty, they should also acknowledge that 
their fellow negotiators have a similar duty in respect of their own peoples. Section 3 indicates 
why, given reasonable disagreement about the principles that should govern an economic 
constitution, the legitimacy of EMU cannot be simply secured by framing the related fiscal rules 
in legal constitutionalist terms. The long-term legitimacy of EMU is compatible only with 
political constitutionalism. Section 4 argues that so long as the EU remains subject to the logic of 
delegation implicit in the normative logic of two-level games, EMU must remain subject to the 
equal control and influence of the different Member State demoi. 
 
 
2. The Normative Legitimacy of Two-Level Contracts  
 
That the EU comprises a normative order raises the question of the credibility, and consequently 
the justifiability, of the reasoning underlying the norms and principles on which the construction 
of EMU is based.  Yet, how might one evaluate such credibility?  We approach this question 
through contractarian political theory.  According to contractarian theory, political authority is to 
be understood as arising from a contract to mutual advantage implicitly or explicitly agreed 
among the members of a political association.  The need for political organization can be 
modelled as the solution to dilemmas of collective action (Buchanan and Tullock, 1960; 
Gauthier, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Weale, 2013).  These dilemmas occur when uncoordinated action 
by separate agents gives rise to a potential gain stemming from cooperation, as in an agreement 
on weights and measures or the rules of the road, or where uncoordinated individual action leads 
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to harmful side-effects from otherwise legitimate human activity, of which pollution and 
resource depletion are the obvious examples.  If we think of political associations as having a 
contractarian logic in this sense, then we can address the issue of credibility by asking what 
conditions have to be satisfied for actors to find a contract that they can rationally support 
(Gauthier, 1986).  
 
The general logic of contractarian analysis can be usefully applied not only to the study of 
natural persons but also to relations between states.  States can impose harmful externalities on 
other states and their populations through cross-boundary pollution, trade restrictions or 
population movements.  They can also fail to secure common advantages through a lack of 
political coordination.  The EU has often been portrayed as a mechanism for overcoming these 
problems in the international arena (Moravcsik 1993). The assumption is that the policies that 
fall within the competence of the EU are in the long-term common interest of the Member States, 
offering Pareto improvements over a prevailing status quo for all concerned. However, there are 
also issues that are subject to the logic of the prisoner’s dilemma. Each Member State may be 
better off with an agreed policy that all other Member States comply with but it does not, than it 
would be with one that it complied with as well, even if all would be worse off without any 
agreement.  Yet, if this logic is clear to all, none would rationally comply and so the policy will 
either never be agreed or will unravel over time.   Thus, the fundamental problem to be solved in 
any political contract between states is that of inducing credibility in others of one’s commitment 
to the policy to be agreed.  To overcome the free rider problem requires states to be able to make 
credible commitments to one another about their willingness to fulfil their obligations even on 
those occasions when fulfilling those obligations proves onerous.   
 
The logic of the N-person prisoner’s dilemma was reflected in the construction of EMU.   As 
Issing (2008: 234-6) has clearly explained, it was thought that, because democratic competition 
works to create deficit financing, thereby undermining the long-term stability of the currency and 
the public finances, the euro was designed to represent depoliticised and hence stable money.  
On this analysis, the political benefits of deficit spending in the form of votes gained by 
governing parties are enjoyed by national players, while the potential negative effects, notably 
higher interest rates, are felt by all states.  So, it is rational for prudent states to seek to ensure 
that they do not incur the spill-over effects of others’ deficit spending through a no bail-out rule.  
The alternative to such a rule is to leave discipline to the markets.  However, within a currency 
union there is no exchange rate risk from deficit financing, borrowing premiums remain low over 
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a period of time and credit risk builds up (Issing, 2008: 193-4).  Aware of this possibility, no 
rational state would prudently enter into an unconstrained currency union.  Hence, in order for 
such an agreement to take place, states must commit to funding their own borrowing.  Each state 
has to be able to make a credible commitment to other states about the maximum deficits that 
they are willing to tolerate in their public spending plans.  This rationale underlay the no bail-out 
clause of the Maastricht Treaty.  The Stability and Growth Pact arose from the recognition that 
the Maastricht rules of no bail-out and no exit were insufficient to prevent Member States 
continuing to run excessive deficits.  The idea was that the scope for fiscal adjustments among 
participating states had to be defined once and for all.  Political representatives at the Member 
State level could still coordinate fiscal and monetary policy, but only on condition that the 
monetary component was fixed exogenously by an independent European bank, the ECB, that 
had been deliberately isolated from political interference.  (For this logic, see Issing, 2008: 193-
5).  
 
When Germany and France breached the provisions of the SGP in 2005, Member States within 
the contract of monetary union had an incentive to strengthen its monitoring and compliance 
aspects even more.  With the coming of the financial crisis, the next stage of the contractarian 
logic was to embed the SGP in the European Semester, together with the Six Pack and the Two 
Pack, the effects of which were not only to increase the intensity of the monitoring of budgetary 
plans, but also to ensure coordination among Member States before those plans were put to 
national parliaments. The Fiscal Compact, the aim of which is to alter the institutional structure 
of domestic political arrangements to prevent excessive deficits from arising or rectify them as 
quickly as possible if they do exist, reinforces these provisions. As contractarian theory predicts, 
these devices emerge where previous commitment has been shown wanting and there is no 
alternative to continuing collective association (Weale, 2015). In other words, when 
commitments turned out not to be credible, the logic of contractual association is to seek to 
reinforce compliance by increased monitoring, penalties and institutional restructuring.  
 
However, this contractarian logic can only be applied to states in a straightforward way so long 
as we are prepared to regard those states as unitary actors.  Yet, treating states as unitary actors is 
merely a simplifying assumption, useful for the purposes of some types of analysis but distorting 
if taken as an accurate representation of an empirical situation.  States are collective entities 
made up of constellations of many actors.  In political associations modelled according to the 
norms of two-level games, the political representatives of each state simultaneously owe 
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obligations to the political representatives of other states and to their own populations (Savage 
and Weale, 2009), with implications for their ability to comply with their contractual 
commitments. 
 
The credible commitment that each state has to be able to make to every other concerns such 
matters as the maximum budget deficits that they will allow in their public spending plans, the 
rate at which deficits will be rectified and the balance between the growth of GDP and the 
growth of public expenditure.  However, the commitment of states in regard to these policy 
strategies can only be made credible provided that each state enjoys the confidence of its 
citizens. Only if states enjoy the confidence of their citizens will these states possess the capacity 
to implement the policies implied by the international agreement.  In the modern world, this 
confidence and the resulting capacity rest upon democratic political legitimation.  Monetary 
union implies, then, that each state can have the confidence that all other states can secure 
sufficient on-going domestic support to meet their consequent obligations.  Hence, only if states 
enjoy democratic legitimacy will other states have reason to believe that their commitments are 
credible. 
 
A similar inter-locking logic applies to the relationship of states to their citizens.  For 
international agreements to be credible, the governments responsible for implementing them 
must be able to give domestic populations good reasons for compliance, showing how an 
agreement will serve the collective interest. At the same time, each state must recognize that all 
other states that are parties to the agreement are similarly acting as representatives of their 
citizens.  The state parties are thus engaged in a two-level game, in which the terms of the 
agreement have to be simultaneously acceptable to other negotiating parties and to their 
domestic constituents.  Simultaneity in this context does not mean 'occurring at the same time', 
but indicates that any international agreement must fulfil two sets of conditions.  First, an 
international agreement requires 'fair dealing' among states as the representatives of their 
peoples; and second, states must ensure the general acceptability of the agreement to their 
respective peoples and be able to justify their international commitments, including any 
provisions for side payments, as being a reasonable way of advancing their joint and several 
common interests.  Unless this second condition is met, so that a state can guarantee the backing 
of the people it represents, no other state party to the putative contract can be confident that a 
commitment made to it is credible. 
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In short, the logic of collective commitment in a monetary union presupposes the logic of 
political democracy at the national level. Unless all the state parties to an agreement possess a 
credible democracy at the national level, it is a practical contradiction at the international level 
for them to enter into commitments with each other, since, in those circumstances, no state could 
rationally trust the commitments of the other states or be trustworthy itself.  Consequently, pace 
certain analysts of the EU (Scharpf 1999, Majone 2001) input legitimacy at the domestic level 
cannot be substituted by output legitimacy at the international level – particularly if the 
beneficial effects of those outputs vary over time and between the different parties to the 
agreement in ways that might be regarded as unfair (Bellamy 2010, a point acknowledged by the 
post-crisis analyses of Scharpf 2011 and Majone 2012). Therefore, the search for ‘an ever closer 
union of the peoples of Europe’ is in effect a search for credible commitment devices among the 
contracting Member States in respect of the peoples whom they represent (Bellamy 2013).  
 
The need for domestic political legitimacy is not simply a political fact; it is also a reason within 
a normative order.  An international agreement involves each state recognising that all other 
states are embedded within a normative order that governs their internal and external relations.  
Consequently, each state requires democratic legitimation for its commitments.  The most 
elaborately worked out example of the logic of such a normative order is that provided by the 
German Federal Constitutional Court in its jurisprudence on EMU starting with Brunner (Federal 
Constitutional Court, 1993).  That jurisprudence recognises that the German state needs to be 
able to enter into long-term international commitments in order to be able to secure benefits that 
are only available through internationally coordinated action.  At the same time, the 
jurisprudence of the Court insists that any international commitment must be consistent with 
those principles of the Basic Law that binds the German state in perpetuity to the principle of 
democratic authority stemming from the people.  In particular, the voting rights of German 
citizens should not be compromised by the German parliament losing meaningful control over 
the direction of economic policy.  Therefore, the Court has seen its task as being to make it 
legally and constitutionally possible for the German state to enter into and honour international 
agreements that are in its interests and in the interests of other states who are party to the 
agreement, whilst at the same time retaining the principle of the democratic self-determination of 
the German people that is a fundamental element of the Basic Law. In a series of judgements, the 
Court has reasoned that these different demands can be reconciled through the doctrine of 
delegation. So long as the international agreement could be said to rest on the delegated authority 
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of the Member States and the Bundestag retained the power of revoking Germany’s participation 
in the international agreement, then the principle of democratic self-determination was respected.   
 
As Gustavsson (1998) noted a while back, the Court’s reasoning rested upon three assumptions 
about EMU: its revocability by the Bundestag, its marginality in terms of the scope of 
obligations it implied, and its predictability.  The subsequent jurisprudence of the Court has had 
to deal with the failure of one or more of these assumptions obtaining in practice.  Thus, in a 
recent judgement on the constitutionality of the policy of OMTs by the ECB (Federal 
Constitutional Court, 2014a), a majority of the judges ruled that OMTs were unconstitutional, 
because they involved an open-ended commitment by the German government.  Although the 
Court offers its own (sceptical) interpretation of the compatibility of the ECB’s planned action 
with treaty and constitutional requirements, and in this respect referred the matter to the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, the kernel of its judgement turned on the force of Article 38(1) of 
the German Constitution, which the Court interpreted, in line with its own previous 
jurisprudence, as requiring that state authority not be transferred to the extent to which it makes 
democratic control nugatory.  The right to vote is in effect defined as the right to vote in an 
election where the result will lead to meaningful parliamentary control over the conditions of 
collective life, thereby expressing the self-determination of the people.  In this judgement, 
democratic control implies marginality and revocability.  Democratic self-determination cannot 
render nugatory the scope of the Bundestag’s authority, and, if the German government failed to 
contest the policy of OMTs, then its actions can be revoked.  (See also Lindseth, 2010: 24.) 
 
On many matters of international agreement domestic acceptability can be presumed because the 
issues involved are technical, have low political salience or can be negotiated with the agreement 
of specific interest groups who share a consensus on which polices best serve their mutual 
advantage.  In other words, they satisfy something like a marginality requirement.  Prior to 
EMU, the EU’s competences largely concerned such low salient issues and hence aroused 
comparatively little democratic contestation (Moravcsik 2003). However, the logic of monetary 
union does not fall into any of these categories.  Although it is technical, its ramifications are 
wide.  Few items are as politically salient as the reliability of a nation's currency.  And interest 
groups typically take different and incompatible positions on the desirability of different 
monetary policies.  In these circumstances, the assumption that states are acting as authorized 
representatives of their populations will break down, unless there are good reasons for thinking 
that the authorization is open-ended (hence the shift in the post-crisis analyses of Scharpf 2011 
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and Majone 2012, that unlike Moravscik 2012, have moved close to the argument made here).  
However, as the jurisprudence of the German Federal Constitutional Court shows, after 1993 no 
other state had reason to think that the authorization was open-ended in the case of Germany.  It 
was predictable that at some stage the limits of monetary integration would be met.  This line of 
argument can be generalised.  For just as other states had no reason for thinking that Germany 
would have an irrevocable commitment to all the implications of EMU, so no one in Germany 
could reasonably think that all other states could retain a democratic mandate for abiding by the 
rules of EMU when those terms became unpredictably onerous.   
 
The practical contradiction at the heart of EMU is that Member States could only find the terms 
of the contract credible on condition that they could assume that the commitments entered into 
by all other Member States went beyond the scope of democratic legitimation within those states. 
That the contradiction revealed itself in the instability of the political contract on which EMU 
rested arose in part from the predictable unpredictability of monetary union.  That feature in turn 
stemmed from the fallibility of political judgement within the circumstances of politics, an 
element of the normative logic that we discuss in the next section. 
 
 
3. Liberalism versus Legal Constitutionalism 
 
Legal constitutionalism of the sort that underlies the constitution of EMU represents one version 
of liberal traditions of thought, one that is notably counter-majoritarian in its implications.  
According to that tradition, if modern democracies have the characteristics attributed to them by 
neo-liberal legal constitutionalists, these commitments could not be credible, since the 
governments of the same states that entered into the contract would be prone to myopic and 
short-term sectional pressures such that they would take any opportunities that might arise to free 
ride on the cooperation of others.  If the temptation to free ride is built into democratic 
governments in this way, then there is no credible basis for commitment on the part of any 
potential party to the contract.  The only basis for a credible agreement on monetary union would 
be through the general establishment of legal economic constitutions at the national level, 
underpinned by powerful counter-majoritarian institutions, so as to break the link between public 
expenditure and responsiveness to the preferences of the population.  Of course, this proposal is 
an implication of the neo-liberal legal constitutionalist analysis, and the first steps along such a 
path are embodied in the requirements of the TSCG. 
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However, counter-majoritarian legal constitutionalism in the economic realm is only one way of 
reading the liberal tradition.  Indeed, that tradition is at odds with another strand of the liberal 
tradition that stresses that any constitutional political contract should recognise the ‘burdens of 
judgement’ in its construction (Rawls, 1996: 54-8).  On this view, the burdens of judgement arise 
from such general features of human judgement as the complexity of empirical evidence, the 
different weight that different persons will put on different types of evidence, the vagueness of 
relevant concepts and the problems of assessing evidence.  Given the burdens of judgement, the 
argument is that a political constitution should refrain from imposing requirements on those 
subject to it that are inherently controversial going beyond widely shared assumptions.  Rawls 
himself generally used the argument from the burdens of judgement to exclude from 
constitutional entrenchment religious doctrines, because they rested on controversial 
philosophical premises, a feature of such doctrines that became an issue in the convention on the 
putative EU constitution (Olsen, 2004).  However, at one point, Rawls (1996: 225) gives the 
example of disputed ‘elaborate economic theories of general equilibrium’ as involving inherently 
controversial views that should not be given constitutional status.  The fair value of political 
liberties cannot be maintained if some views are given a privileged constitutional position vis à 
vis other views. 
 
Does the entrenchment of a particular form of Hayekian theory in the constitution of EMU fall 
foul of this condition?  There are a number of reasons to suppose that it does.  Firstly, Hayek 
himself opposed EMU in part because he recognised economic policy, even of a libertarian kind, 
was not a matter that could be legally entrenched. Instead, he advocated free competition 
between rival currencies provided by private rather than public banks (Hayek 1978).  Although 
this is a position that Issing (2000) attempted to contest on neo-Hayekian grounds, Hayek’s 
scepticism about EMU was a logical consequence of his belief that viable economic orders were 
the evolutionary product of human action but not of human design (Hayek, 1979).  In other 
words, the attempt to construct an international monetary order by political fiat would replicate 
the fallacies of central planning on which the road to serfdom was based. 
 
Secondly, even within neo-liberalism, there are other traditions of theory that take a non-
evolutionary view of the economic order.  Although sometimes identified with a Hayekian 
perspective, even by Hayek (1967: 252-3) himself on some occasions, German ordo-liberal 
economists like Eucken and Röpke, took the view that a functioning economy presupposes a 
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moment of constitutional founding in which the rules of its operation are determined (Eucken, 
1951a and 1951b; compare Goldschmidt, 2000; Nicholls, 1994; and Peukert, 2000).  As 
commentators (for example, Sally, 1998; Streit and Wohlgemuth, 2000) have noted, this ordo-
liberal tradition contrasts with the Hayekian position in being rationalist and constructivist.  It 
presupposes that the institutional form of the economy is determined within an already 
established legal order and political community.  Economic integration is not an instrument to 
create a political community, but an expression of the political choices of that community.  
 
Thirdly, this ordo-liberal view is consistent with the worries many economists and policy-makers 
had expressed before the euro crisis had revealed the problems about the sequencing of European 
political union and monetary union  and about the design flaws built into EMU.  For example, in 
a paper summarising a wide range of work, Bordo and Jonung (2003: 43-4) pointed out that 
EMU lacked both a lender of last resort by contrast with other modern central banks who were 
able to ensure liquidity, and a central authority to supervise financial systems, including the 
commercial banks.  They went on to point out that the absence of any central co-ordination of 
fiscal policies within EMU combined with 'unduly strict criteria for debt and deficits … implies 
that EMU will not be able to respond to asymmetric shocks and disturbances in a satisfactory 
way'.  Finally, as many other economists also noted, they pointed out that Europe is too large an 
area to form a well-functioning currency union, with the efficiency gains from increased trade 
not large enough to outweigh the costs of surrendering control over national monetary policies. 
 
Fourthly, it is well established that different national traditions of economic policy making fed 
into the creation of EMU.  For reasons of history and intellectual tradition, German policy 
making gave pride of place to the goal of price stability underpinned by the independence of the 
central bank.  By contrast, French thinking gave priority to gouvernement économique, a view of 
the relationship between government and the economy in which executive action played a large 
role in securing the day-to-day steering and coordination of the economy as well as providing 
capital for investment in major projects (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999; Jabko, 2006: 168-72).  
Historically and institutionally rooted traditions do not disappear in a new policy framework, but 
manifest themselves in different ways.  In particular, when it comes to questions of how 
countries recover from large economic shocks, there will be differences in what is seen as 
justifiable requirements, say, to re-establish internationally credible debt levels within the 
framework of the Excessive Deficits Procedure.  Similar differences of judgement will affect 
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how countries think about the institutionalisation of debt brakes and other constitutional devices 
under the TSCG. 
 
The implication of these points is that legal constitutionalism presupposes that there can be 
agreement on the basis of the constitutional essentials of a European monetary order when the 
epistemic conditions do not exist to establish that agreement. Yet, even the German Bundesbank, 
so often presented as a model independent central bank, had its independence from the German 
government tested both by Adenauer and Schmidt (Kennedy, 1991: 37-42).  If within one 
country, with powerful political and intellectual traditions justifying a strong independent central 
bank, the issue can be contested, it is not surprising that a rigid pan-European economic 
constitution based on the idea of automatic rules will be contested even more.    
 
 
4. Political Constitutionalism and European Economic Governance 
 
The argument so far may be summarised as follows.  Credible commitment by governments at 
the international level presupposes political legitimacy at the domestic level; but the domestic 
legitimacy of democratic governments in turn presupposes that commitments may be modified or 
altered through political processes.  Moreover, the epistemic conditions arising from the burdens 
of judgement reinforce the need for open discussion and democratic deliberation.  Legal 
constitutionalism at the international level, therefore, risks undermining rather than reinforcing 
the credibility of state commitments if the measures legally entrenched are matters that should be 
subject to on-going political debate by domestic electorates.  
 
Political constitutionalism offers an alternative to legal constitutionalism (Bellamy, 2007). By 
contrast to legal constitutionalism, political constitutionalism contends the terms of the political 
contract must be subject to on-going debate among citizens with regard to both the procedures of 
decision-making and the substance of decisions.  Judgments about either cannot be legitimately 
entrenched or handled by judicial or technical bodies that are isolated from democratic processes 
because such isolation fails to recognise the equal legal and political status of citizens. Political 
constitutionalists argue that the functional complexity, ethical diversity and openness of liberal 
societies make individual judgements about the public good inevitably partial and fallible. 
Because we are inescapably limited in our knowledge and experience, even the most 
conscientious persons will tend to reason from their own values and interests and be prone to 
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error with regard to the present and future interests of others. If the collective decisions needed to 
regulate social life are to be not only impartial but also well informed with regard to the views 
and circumstances of those to whom they apply, so that they treat citizens with equal respect and 
concern, then citizens must have equal influence and control over the direction of public policy. 
Pace neo-liberal thinkers, such as Hayek, such equal influence and control cannot be provided by 
markets but only by a democratic process, albeit indirectly through the election of decision-
makers (Bellamy 1994).  
 
Legal constitutionalism in its purest form tries to place the legal and political system itself and 
even many public policies beyond political contestation, defining in substantive and concrete 
terms how both might be best configured so as to realise equal concern and respect.  By contrast, 
political constitutionalism in its purest form regards legitimacy as dependent upon the ability to 
employ existing political procedures to contest the procedural and substantive adequacy of the 
democratic system and its policies through the constant struggle of citizens to exercise equal 
influence and control over both. Most liberal democracies combine different degrees of each of 
them, some nearer to the political constitutionalist end of the spectrum and others more at the 
legal constitutionalist end. The various Member States manifest considerable diversity in this 
respect, making all but the most abstract and procedural forms of legal constitutionalism difficult 
to agree. Hence the need for political constitutionalism between even those Member States that 
have legal constitutionalist regimes.  
 
From the perspective of the normative logic of two-level games, the legitimacy of the integration 
process depends on its taking the form of what might be termed ‘republican inter-
governmentalism’ (Bellamy 2013). That is, the governments and their agents can only enter into 
credible commitments with each other to the extent that they possess on-going democratic 
authorisation to represent their respective peoples, and acknowledge the equal right and 
obligation of all the other governments to represent their peoples (Pettit 2010). This logic stands 
behind the largely consensual character of much EU decision-making, not least the unanimity 
rule for any Treaty change and the need for such changes to obtain domestic ratification within 
all 28 Member States. Such features have led a number of commentators to remark on how the 
EU is best characterised not as a democracy, with EU citizens forming a pan-European demos, 
but as a demoicracy between the different peoples of the Member States (Chevenal and 
Schimmelfennig 2013, Nicolaidis 2013).   
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We have argued that the legal constitutionalist mechanisms embodied in the TSCG cannot 
provide EMU with political legitimacy of a normative kind. It is not possible to model the 
choices of the actors according to the normative logic of the two-level contract in such a way that 
the practical reasoning behind these mechanisms is credible.  If such reasoning is not credible in 
a contractarian model, it suggests that it may not be credible in practice.  Instead, such a policy 
must remain part of the political constitution provided by the on-going democratic influence and 
control of those subject to it. Within the EU as presently constituted, this political constitution 
must reflect the normative logic of two-level games. As such, political legitimacy comes not 
from a single EU demos but from an agreement among the different demoi of the Eurozone, as 
negotiated by their elected representatives. For EMU to be legitimate, therefore, it must be under 
the demoicractic control of the several European states.  The logic here is that of the delegation 
of authority, with the problem of democratic legitimacy in the EU that not of the democratic 
deficit but of the democratic disconnect  - the failure to ensure policy-making remains under the 
equal influence and control of the constituted peoples of the Union via their domestic democratic 
processes (Lindseth, 2010: 234). 
 
Can such demoicratic control be achieved in the case of a currency union? A detailed response 
lies outside the scope of this article. Here we wish merely to indicate the institutional structures 
needed to place EMU under a political rather than a legal constitution, and to note how these 
structures exist within the EU to a sufficient degree for this proposal to be plausible. The main 
lines of such an approach can be found in the German Constitutional Court’s judgements from 
1993 onwards, to which we referred earlier. According to the Court, the national parliament, the 
Bundestag, plays an integral role in realising the ‘right to democracy’ guaranteed by the German 
Constitution, with its budgetary responsibilities an intrinsic aspect of that role given that 
decisions on revenue and expenditure constrain the choice of public policies that shape the social 
life of citizens. Adopting reasoning that encapsulates both political constitutionalism and the 
demoicratic approach, the Court has argued that ‘sufficient space’ has to exist for the citizens of 
the Member States to be able to interpret the fundamental rights that underlie their ‘economic, 
cultural and social living conditions.’ Given reasonable disagreements about the relative 
importance and nature of these rights and how they might be best interpreted and realised – 
disagreements that have been resolved in different ways over time within each of the Member 
States, as their different political and constitutional traditions attest – European unification could 
not be conducted in such a way as to leave no space for the demoi of the contracting parties to 
determine their collective life according to their differing ‘cultural, historical and linguistic 
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perceptions’  through ‘public discourse in the party, political and parliamentary spheres of public 
politics’ (Federal Constitutional Court 2009)  As a result, the Court has insisted on the 
Bundestag’s right of participation in EFSF, particularly in authorising extensions of the 
guarantees for the fund (Federal Constitutional Court 2014a). 
Drawing on this reasoning, two roles for national parliaments emerge within EMU. The 
first, domestic, role is to ensure that in negotiating budgetary rules at the EU level, the elected 
executives of each of the contracting Member States act on the authority of their national 
parliaments, and that the subsequent undertakings remain subject to their control and scrutiny. 
There are signs that other national parliaments are following the German lead. For example, 
Spain has set up a parliamentary budget office – the Oficina Presupuestaria de las Cortes 
Generales – that checks and assesses the execution of the budget and provides information to the 
legislature. The French and Italian Parliaments have likewise requested higher standards of 
information and transparency on issues of European economic governance. The second, inter-
parliamentary, role, involves national parliaments working together to ensure that EU measures 
treat each of the Member States with equal concern and respect as self-governing polities. That 
role was developed formally with Lisbon and the measures relating to their mutual guardianship 
of subsidiarity, such as the Early Warning Mechanism. Such measures have increased the 
Commission’s obligation to inform and give reasons to parliaments for their policies, while 
encouraging parliaments to develop the requisite scrutiny and control procedures. Most 
importantly, the role of national parliaments was explicitly acknowledged in Article 13 of the 
Fiscal Treaty, which provided the basis for the creation of the Interparliamentary Conference on 
Economic and Financial Governance of the European Union.  Although both these roles remain 
as yet rudimentary and untested, they nevertheless provide the beginnings of the sort of 
demoicratic political constitution we have advocated for EMU. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We have argued that the normative order of the EU requires that contracts between Member 
States be seen as a two-level game, in which executives can only sign credible agreements as the 
duly authorised agents of their domestic peoples. We termed this demoicratic structure 
republican intergovernmentalism. We argued that the attempt to view the neo-liberal budgetary 
constraints of the Fiscal Compact as a supranational legal constitution not only conflicted with 
this normative order but also was unreasonable in denying the reasonable disagreements among 
both citizens and Member States about economic policy. Instead such measures have to be 
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subject to a political constitution of a demoicratic kind. The continuing role for national 
parliaments insisted on by the German Constitutional Court in its Lisbon Judgment and 
elsewhere (Federal Constitutional Court 2009) provide the basis for such a political 
constitutional framework for EMU. 
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